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Introduction 
The opinion polls got it wrong in the 2015 General Election.  The Conservatives won a small 
overall majority in the House of Commons, contrary to almost all predictions except for the 
exit poll on the night itself.  Most previous polls had predicted a hung parliament, with many 
indicating that Labour would be the largest party.  The average Conservative and Labour vote 
shares predicted by eight different survey agencies were identical at 33.6 per cent which 
understated the actual Conservative vote by 4.2 per cent and over-stated the Labour vote by 
2.4 per cent in the final pre-election polls.  We have to go back to the general election of 
1992 to find a comparable set of inaccurate pre-election polls.  In contrast the exit poll was 
spot on, but that had the advantage of interviewing people who actually voted, since the 
respondents were approached outside the polling stations.  The same was clearly not true for 
participants in the pre-election polls.   
 This outcome prompted the British Polling Council to set up an inquiry into what 
went wrong and their preliminary report was published in January of this year1.  To put this in 
context there were a total of 1,942 polls conducted in Britain between 2010 and 2015.  This 
compares with the approximately 3,500 polls in the field between 1945 and 2010.  So polling 
exploded in the years of the Coalition government.  The report provides a careful analysis of 
the various factors which might explain what happened and it was written by an experienced 
team of researchers.  They draw attention to a number of factors including unrepresentative 
samples, problems of weighting the data, biased responses and interviewees who misled 
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pollsters about their voting intentions.  Perhaps not surprisingly they ended up concluding 
that that there is ‘no silver bullet, the risk of polling misses in the future can be reduced not 
removed’ (p.54).  
 This article critically evaluates the findings of the report, which by and large are 
sensible and judicious.  But it draws attention to two problems which might give a misleading 
picture of what went wrong, and so cause misunderstandings about what should be done in 
the future.  The first problem relates to mode comparisons: that is, whether a survey was 
conducted on the internet, by telephone or by interviewers talking to people in their homes.  
The second relates to respondents misreporting their voting intentions in these polls, 
something which is rather neglected in the report.   
How Do Pollsters Make Forecasts? 
 Before looking at the problems in the polls it is helpful to explain how pollsters go 
about making their forecasts of the vote.  Firstly, they collect a sample of respondents 
typically using quota samples in the case of internet surveys and random samples in the case 
of telephone surveys.  A quota sample tries to replicate the characteristics of the electorate in 
the sample, using information from a variety of sources such as the Census.  For example, 
young males of working age make up a given percentage of the electorate and the polling 
company will aim to replicate this proportion in the sample. Internet quota samples are drawn 
from a big panel of potential respondents compiled by the polling companies from many 
sources, and they are paid a modest amount to participate in the survey.  In contrast telephone 
surveys use a computer to dial numbers at random in order to select the respondents.  This 
type of random sampling faces considerable difficulties in persuading individuals to be 




Once the data are collected then they are weighted to look like the known 
demographic profile of the electorate. Weighting means that not all respondents are counted 
equally.  To take an illustrative example, if a survey were to pick up only half of the young 
people needed to be representative of the electorate, then those who actually do appear in the 
sample are counted twice.  This makes opinions in the survey as a whole more likely to 
reflect the electorate in general. In relation to turnout, additional weighting often takes place 
in order to adjust for the probability that an individual will actually vote, using information 
acquired from questions in the survey.  Weighting is a useful device but it cannot make a 
really bad sample representative of the wider population.  When this is all done the forecast 
of  how people will vote on the day can be made.  
What Went Wrong in 2015?  
The authors of the report stressed that they looked for general explanations of what went 
wrong rather than specific issues linked to a particular polling agency or method of collecting 
the data.  They dismissed a number of possible explanations such as voter registration 
problems, question wording biases, distortions introduced by postal voting and survey modes.  
The problem with many of these explanations is that if they were relevant they would show 
up in successive general elections, producing problems for all pre-election polls.  In fact the 
polls have been fairly accurate in predicting outcomes, subject to the usual margins of error, 
in the great majority of elections since the Second World War.  This was certainly true for 
elections between 1997 and 2010. 
 The report goes on to concentrate on four possible explanations for the failure: late 
swing, sampling issues, herding behaviour and misreporting.  Late swing refers to the 
possibility that some voters opted for the Conservatives at the expense of Labour and other 
parties at the last minute, and this was not captured in the polls because they were in the field 
before it happened.  Sampling issues relate to whether or not the surveys were actually 
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representative of the wider electorate.  Herding behaviour refers to the fact that polling 
agencies assiduously follow each other and if one agency appears to be out of line with its 
competitors, it may be tempted to readjust its weighting schemes in order to bring them back 
into line.  It should be said that pollsters have a strong incentive to get things right and they 
do not do this kind of thing in order to deliberately bias the results; but they are often 
motivated by legitimate concerns that their own surveys might have methodological 
weaknesses if they are out of line with their competitors.  Finally, there is ‘over-reporting’, 
that is, respondents saying they are going to vote or that they actually voted when they did 
not, something to be discussed more fully below. 
 On the question of a late swing, pollsters try to identify this by re-interviewing some 
of the individuals from their pre-election surveys at the last minute, to see if there is any 
evidence of a change.  They also interview people before and after the election to see if there 
is a change in their reported behaviour.  The conclusion of the report was that there was some 
evidence of a last-minute swing towards the Conservatives, although it was not very strong 
and its contribution to the overall error in the polls was fairly modest.  
 The issue of sampling bias is more complicated and it comes down to the difference 
between random samples and quota samples.  Traditionally the ‘gold standard’ in survey 
research has been random samples in which respondents are pre-selected using probability 
theory and the interviewers talk to people in their homes – so-called ‘face-to-face’ surveys.  
The basic idea of a random sample is that everyone in the electorate has a chance, albeit very 
small, of being chosen for interviewing.  This means that people in hard to reach groups such 
old people not connected to the internet can still end up in the sample, making it 
representative of the electorate as a whole. This is not necessarily true for quota samples.   
 That said, the report rightly does not recommend that pollsters go to random sample 
face to face interviewing designs in order to forecast elections.  This is because such designs 
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face formidable problems; they cost a great deal of money and it can take several months to 
collect the data.  The biggest problem, however, is that response rates for these surveys have 
been declining over time.  The first British Election Study conducted by David Butler and 
Donald Stokes in 1963 had a response rate of 79 per cent, so that almost 8 out of 10 of the 
people chosen to be interviewed actually participated in the study.  In contrast the response 
rate for the 2015 British Election Study face-to-face survey was 55.9 per cent.  This raises the 
obvious problem that a well-designed probability sample can cease to be representative of the 
electorate if nearly half of the people chosen to be interviewed don’t participate.      
 The report makes a number of comparisons between the 2015 British Election Study 
and the British Social Attitudes face-to-face surveys and various internet and telephone polls. 
These suggest that the former were more accurate than the latter when it came to forecasting 
the vote.  But this is misleading.  Firstly, the internet and telephone polls were done before 
the election whereas the face-to-face surveys were done afterwards.  This is problematic 
because the election itself changes opinions and behaviour.  There is a tendency for some 
respondents to claim that they voted for winners after an election even when they did not.  In 
the 2015 context, this makes support for the Conservatives appear higher in a post-election 
survey.   
 A fairer comparison would be to examine the party vote shares in the British Election 
Study face-to-face survey in 2015 with a post-election internet survey.  This can be done 
using the Essex internet panel survey of 2015 which interviewed the same people before and 
after the election2.  The Conservative vote share in this post-election internet survey was 35.7 
per cent compared with the actual election vote share of 37.7 per cent, and the Labour vote 
share was 29.8 per cent compared with the actual result of 31.2 per cent.  These discrepancies 




 An additional problem for these comparisons is that the British Election Study face-
to-face survey was itself fairly unrepresentative of the electorate.  We know this by looking at 
the percentage of respondents in the survey who actually voted.  It is possible to check the 
turnout records of survey respondents at the local level since these are held in case there is a 
legal challenge to an election in a particular constituency. These records show whether 
respondents voted, but they do not of course show how they voted.  This exercise showed that 
76 per cent of the BES survey respondents actually voted, in an election which had an overall 
turnout of 66 per cent.  As the report points out: ‘Having too many or too few of some types of 
people in sample translates into error in predicted vote if those different types of people also 
vote differently’ (p.39).  This means that comparisons made between the BES survey and pre-
election polls are problematic.  All of the surveys appear to have too many politically 
engaged respondents relative to the electorate, because disengaged people are increasingly 
reluctant to participate in any kind of survey. 
 On the issue of herding, one way of identifying this is to look at how variable the 
different polls were during early parts of the campaign compared with the final pre-election 
polls. The argument is that the range of results across polling companies should be roughly 
the same over the entire campaign, but if this narrows significantly as the campaign comes to 
an end that could be evidence of herding.  One objection to this is that voters might be 
reaching a consensus as the campaign progresses which would itself produce a narrowing of 
the range across polls.  But this can be addressed by applying a common weighting scheme to 
the polls instead of the different weighting schemes that the pollsters actually use.   
 Herding means pollsters adjusting the weighting schemes, and so if convergence 
between polls is driven by the voters rather than by differences in the weighting schemes it 
will look exactly the same in the common scheme as in the separate schemes.  However, if 
this comparison throws up differences, it suggests that weighting schemes are being adjusted 
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in a way consistent with herding behaviour.  Of course it is possible to ask pollsters if they 
did actually adjust their weightings in light of what their competitors were doing after the 
event, but it is not clear that such a question will get a straight answer.  There is in fact 
evidence to support herding in the data, but it is modest and certainly not enough to explain 
why the polls got it wrong.   
 The final issue of over-reporting was referred to in the report but not analysed at all. 
This is quite an important issue, and is examined next.  
Do People Lie to Pollsters? 
  It has long been recognized that some people lie to interviewers about their turnout.  
An extensive report on ‘over-reporting’ as it is called was published in 1968 in the United 
States. This used data from the American National Election Studies, which at the time 
validated the electoral participation of their respondents.  Over-reporting means people 
claiming to have voted when they did not, and there is a second group of under-reporters, or 
those who claimed not to have voted when the records show that they actually did (a much 
smaller group).  The former arises primarily from people misleading interviews and the latter 
more from people forgetting what they did on polling day, which is quite possible when face-
to-face surveys take months to complete. The overall conclusion of the report was that: 
‘Estimates of  turnout  have  consistently  exceeded the  population  figures  by  about  12  to 
13  per  cent’. 3  
 Over-reporting of turnout occurs for a number of reasons. Firstly, there is a ‘social 
desirability bias’ causing respondents to lie about their turnout because they want to appear to 
be good citizens in the eyes of the interviewer.  Secondly, there is a ‘spiral of silence’ 
argument which suggests that voters will mislead interviewers about their turnout  if they 
think that public acknowledgements of voting  for a party will be frowned on by others if that 
party is unpopular at the time.  This idea gave rise to the concept of ‘Shy Tories’ in the 1992 
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general election, in which the polls underestimated support for the Conservatives in the pre-
election surveys.  These Tories would tell the interviewers that they were not going to vote, 
and so avoided answering the follow-up question about which party they would support in the 
election. Thirdly, there is a more recent concept of ‘Lazy Labour’ supporters in which 
respondents said they were going to support the party in pre-election polls but then did not 
vote on the day.  This had the effect of over-estimating support for Labour prior to the 
election.  These are interesting ideas but a multivariate analysis of survey data from the 2010 
election showed little support for them.4 
 A fourth explanation suggests that people who are under pressure to vote from 
friends, family, political parties and others are more likely to lie to interviewers about their 
participation if they fail to vote.  This is prompted by a sense of guilt at not responding to the 
pressure to vote in the first place.  In effect, failing to live up to one’s normative beliefs 
creates pressures for dishonesty.  In the United States some early findings showed that black 
respondents were more likely to over-report than whites because they felt guilty about letting 
down their fellow ethnics by failing to vote.  A similar point can be made about people who 
perceive that big differences exist between the political parties.  If they feel this is true but 
end up not voting then they are more likely to over-report.  Both of these happened in the 
2010 general election. 
 All of the British Election study post-election face-to-face surveys conducted since 
1992 have validated the voting behaviour of their respondents.  This makes it possible to 
identify any trends in over-reporting which might be occurring during a period of almost a 
quarter of a century.  We will focus on the respondents who claim to have voted but did not 
do so, rather than those who forgot that they had participated in the election.  Figure 1 shows 
trends in the percentage of respondents who over-reported in successive British Election 
Study surveys from 1992 to 2015.  To reiterate, this refers to the difference between the 
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validated turnout that is, the percentage of respondents in the surveys who actually voted, and 
the percentage who claimed to have voted when they were asked about it.  A second measure 
in the Figure looks at the difference between the percentage of respondents in the surveys 
who actually voted and the national turnouts in these elections.  Clearly if the surveys are 
accurate then the percentage turnout in the survey should be approximately the same as the 
turnout in the general election.  So looking at validated turnout is a way of measuring the 
accuracy of the surveys in replicating the turnouts in these elections.  
 Figure 1 about here -- 
 The figure suggests that between the 2001 and 2010 elections there was a trend 
increase in over-reporting in the surveys.  In 2001 some 4.1 per cent of respondents were 
over-reporters and this rose to 11.5 per cent by 2010.  However, in the 2015 survey the trend 
appeared to reverse itself and over-reporting fell back 5.1 per cent. Yet this conclusion is 
misleading, since we need to take into account how accurate the surveys were in measuring 
actual turnout in the election.  This is where the discrepancy between the actual turnout of 
survey respondents and the national turnout in the election comes in.  As already indicated, 
the 2015 survey was much less representative of actual levels of turnout than the earlier 
surveys.  By definition over-reporters are non-voters and so clearly if a survey contains too 
many validated voters this will reduce the number of over-reporters – because it means that 
there are fewer non-voters than there should be in the sample.  If we take this into account 
then it is not clear that over-reporting declined significantly in 2015. Overall the data tends to 
support the idea that over-reporting is growing in Britain over time.  People are more likely to 





Discussion and Conclusions 
It is important to get the performance of the polls in the 2015 general election in perspective.  
Internet and telephone polls have been pretty successful in forecasting the results of the great 
majority of general elections since the war, and they have been equally successful in 
predicting the results of mayoral elections in London and elections for the devolved 
assemblies in Wales and Scotland.  Statistical theory predicts that every so often we are going 
to get a rogue result just by chance and it certainly looks like the general election of 2015 was 
one of these.  That said, if there is a trend increase in people refusing to participate in surveys 
which to some extent mirrors the decline in electoral turnout that has occurred since the 
1990s, and the people who do participate are more likely to lie to the pollsters, then it is going 

















Figure 1 Trends in Over-Reporting and in the Validated Turnout of Respondents in 
British Election Surveys 1992 to 2015 
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